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Introduction
The Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000, foresees negotiations on the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU). Non-reciprocal EU-preferences granted to ACP countries under the preceding Lomé Conventions have turned out to be incompatible with World Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations, as they discriminate against developing countries outside the ACP group (Onguglo and Ito 2003) . Moreover, they cannot be conceived as a free trade agreement due to lack of reciprocity. For current non-reciprocal trade preferences, the European Commission has obtained another WTO waiver until the end of 2007 (WTO 2001) .
To ensure compatibility with multilateral rules, the Economic Partnership Agreements aim to establish reciprocal free trade agreements. In other words, not only will the EU provide tarifffree access to its markets for ACP exports, but ACP countries will also be expected to provide tariff-free access to their own markets for EU exports. The new agreements are supposed to enter into force by January 2008 (ACP/EC 2001). For ACP countries which are not ready to enter into an EPA, an alternative framework for trade has to be provided, which should be equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules.
Apart from the incompatibility with multilateral trade rules, there is a widespread perception that Europe's preferences offered to the ACP countries have not really benefited most of them. In fact, the share of EU imports from ACP countries as compared to total EU imports fell from 7.9 per cent in 1980 to 2.8 per cent in 2004 (EUROSTAT 2005) . This can partly be explained by the erosion of EU preferences due to general tariff liberalisation under multilateral agreements. However, it also has become clear that most ACP countries lack the productive and technological capacities, marketing skills, transportation channels, and appropriate technical and sanitary regulations to harness the opportunities offered by Europe's tariff preferences. EPAs are supposed to address all these issues while at the same time enhancing the preferential access that ACP countries already enjoy in European markets. In the East and Southern African region, on which this paper focuses, two separate regional EPA-groupings have been formed: (1) the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Group, comprising 16 member countries of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); 1 and (2) the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Group, 2 consisting of four of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, or SACU minus South Africa) and three neighbouring SADC countries (Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania).
Negotiations are hampered by the fact that these two EPA negotiating groups do not coincide with the current memberships of existing regional integration schemes. Instead, they represent an alternative delineation that cuts across and splits current regional trade arrangements, which in themselves have problems of overlapping memberships. Apart from the fact that six COMESA members belong as well to SADC, the three EAC members are split in their dual membership to COMESA and SADC. Therefore, EPAs negotiating groups will also have effects on the ongoing regional integration efforts, which further complicates the negotiations.
Like most of the ACP economies, East and Southern African countries have strong economic ties with Europe. In terms of trade, the EU's share of total exports from the region accounts for 44 per cent, whereas imports from the European Union amount to 23 per cent of total Karingi et al. (2005) , on the other hand, analyse the impact of the EPAs on all African ACP countries, using both a simple general equilibrium as well as a partial equilibrium model. Due to a limited number of social accounting matrices for African economies, which are necessary for any general equilibrium analysis, they encounter severe data problems in their estimation.
As a consequence, only 7 out of 46 African ACP economies are included in the analysis.
However, this restriction does not apply to the partial equilibrium model, which they apply to 39 African ACP countries. Overall, they find that market integration will result in small positive welfare effects, but losses in tariff revenue can be considerable for individual African countries.
In another study, Keck and Piermartini (2005) estimate the impact of the EPAs in SADC countries. Using a general equilibrium model and focussing on six SADC countries, they find that the EPAs are welfare enhancing overall, leading to a substantive increase in real gross domestic product. Similar to Karingi and associates, Keck and Piermartini also mention that 4 Likewise, averages for 1999 -2003 (OECD 2005 4 the data in the social accounting matrices for African countries has to be viewed with caution.
Moreover, general equilibrium models require a large number of parameters (elasticities), which are usually not available for these countries. Researchers usually circumvent this problem by using figures that have been estimated for high-income countries, but no one can be sure whether this procedure is appropriate for low-income African economies. Any results based on these models, therefore, may be subject to considerable error margins.
In our study, we estimate the trade and budget effects of the proposed EPAs on East and Southern African countries, which belong to either ESA or SADC. For our analysis, we use an appropriate partial equilibrium model and address some of the shortcomings in previous studies. Importantly, we identify the products that are most affected by the proposed EPAs.
Moreover, we highlight the need to consolidate regional trading arrangements in East and Southern Africa, not only for the EPA negotiations, but also to achieve successful south-south preferential trade arrangements.
The paper is organised as follows: The next section provides an overview of current trade protection levels as well as preferential trade agreements in the region. Subsequently, the data and the empirical model used for the analysis are introduced in Section 3, whereas the empirical results are presented in Section 4. It is important to note that the analysis focuses on the impact of the EPAs on East and Southern Africa only and not on the European Union, as the impact on the latter is likely to be rather small. Based on the results, Section 5 discusses various policy options for East and South African countries as well as the need to consolidate the existing regional integration structure. In spite of all these developments, the share of intra-regional trade of the ESA region's total trade increased marginally in all trading blocks, and is substantially lower -some 10 per cent in 2002 (Yagci and Aldaz 2004 ) -compared to regional trading blocks in other parts of the world. Moreover, the bulk of the increased intra-regional trade are concentrated in only two countries: South Africa and Kenya. Both countries supply a large part of the intra-regional exports, while receiving only a small proportion of the imports.
Trade Policy and Regional Trade Agreements in East and Southern Africa
From our point of view, there are at least three reasons that could explain the low levels of regional trade in the face of proliferating agreements. First of all, there is a huge gap between formal agreements and actual implementation. In various countries, the record of implementation of treaties, protocols and agreements is far from satisfactory. African governments have repeatedly committed themselves to unrealistic and unfeasible agreements which have ultimately damaged the credibility of the integration process (e.g., COMESA customs union, or the more recent plan to establish an East African Federation by 2010).
Much of the failure to implement the agreements has to do with concerns about losing much needed customs revenue. What is more worrying, most regional organisations in charge of enforcing the ambitious mandates entrusted to them in their treaties and protocols lack the resources to do so.
A second problem lies in the existence of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting regional integration arrangements within the same region, which continues to make implementation very difficult and imposes a heavy burden on limited administrative resources in the member countries ( Figure 1 ). This problem has been aggravated by the configuration of the groupings set up to negotiate EPAs with the EU, which effectively have divided regional trade arrangements. Either essential rationalisation and harmonisation of agreements take place, or some regional trade arrangements may become irrelevant in the wider ESA and EPA context. Finally, although important progress has been made in removing tariff barriers through the regional trade agreements, much less attention has been devoted to the numerous non-tariff and non-border measures that most countries impose on one another, preventing any substantial increase of intra-regional trade flows. 
Modelling Trade and Budget Effects of EPAs
After highlighting trade protection levels and trade policy issues in the region, we next turn to the modelling framework used in the empirical analysis. As already mentioned in the first section, domestic production data for African countries, which is a prerequisite for a social accounting matrix, is of relatively poor quality or simply not available. For East and Southern Africa, we only have a social accounting matrix for 7 out of 23 countries. 7 Since our main objective is to analyse the effects of the EPAs on as many countries in the region as possible, a general equilibrium model is clearly not the best choice, even though it would be preferable from a theoretical point of view.
As a remedy, we use Verdoorn's (1960) partial equilibrium model to analyse the trade and fiscal effects of the proposed EPAs. Despite its age, it is an appropriate modelling framework, as it focuses on imports from different sources and leaves out domestic production data. It assumes that products are heterogeneous, namely, that they are imperfect substitutes in use.
This assumption is reasonable for our analysis, because a vast majority of European exports to East and Southern Africa consists of manufactured goods (Table 2) . Though there are differences at the country level, European firms export predominately manufactured commodities like transport and telecommunications equipment or electrical and non-electrical machinery, which are more likely to be differentiated by their country of origin than raw materials or agricultural goods. Africa as a share of total production is likely to be very small, therefore infinite supply elasticities is a reasonable assumption.
Verdoorn's model distinguishes between imports from preference beneficiaries (Q 1 ) and from non-beneficiaries (Q 2 ), which add up to total imports (Q). The model is based on two key equations: First, the demand function of the preference donor can be written as:
where P 1 and P 2 denote the prices of beneficiaries' and non-beneficiaries' imports, α 1 and α 2 are share coefficients (α 1 = Q 1 /(Q 1 +Q 2 ) and α 1 +α 2 = 1), β is a parameter and ε represents the elasticity of import demand.
Second, the elasticity of substitution (σ) of preferred and non-preferred imports is defined as:
If we differentiate and rearrange both equations and use the Jones' notation, that is,
we can express changes in preferred and non-preferred imports as follows:
If the tariff (t) is eliminated only on preferred imports and supply elasticities are infinite, then the price of the beneficiaries' imports P ) 0 P ( 2 = 1 changes by
Using (5), and (α ) 0 P ( 2 = 1 +α 2 = 1), (3) can be written as ( )
The total change in preferred imports can be split into two effects: First, a trade creation (TC) effect, which is usually defined as the increase in Q 1 due to (a) an increase in overall consumption and (b) the displacement of domestic production, as prices for preferred imports decline. From the preferred country's point of view, this effect can be written as follows:
Second, trade diversion (TD) is defined as the substitution of preferred for non-preferred imports. This further effect can be obtained from (4), using (5) and :
In addition to the trade effects, East and Southern African countries will observe a decline in customs revenue (CR) due to the preferential tariff elimination. The reduction is equal to the sum of imports from preferred countries and the change in non-preferred imports, both multiplied by the import tariff:
( )
The estimation of trade creation and diversion and of changes in customs revenue has been conducted at the two-digit level of the Harmonised System. At that level of aggregation, the schedule consists of 97 groups of goods. For trade diversion effects, this approach allows a more accurate estimation, since we take competition from importing countries at a disaggregated level into account. In a similar fashion, it enables us to identify those goods that would be particularly affected by the proposed EPAs.
Among ESA countries, only Eritrea had to be excluded from the empirical investigation, as tariff and (reliable) trade data were not available. Consequently, the analysis has been undertaken for a total of 22 out of 23 East and Southern African countries that belong to either the ESA or the SADC EPA negotiating grouping with the EU. The base year is 2003, the most recent year for which trade and tariff data were available.
8
Rather than estimating import demand and substitution elasticities, we had to assume appropriate figures for them, due to a lack of reliable data. More specifically, we used figures 8 See the Appendix for data sources for all variables.
12 that have been estimated for a range of other developing countries and differentiated between agricultural goods, raw materials and manufactures, as the elasticities for these product groups are likely to differ (Table 3) . 9 For instance, raw materials like oil products or gas are much more homogeneous than specialised machinery. Given income levels and the import structure in East and Southern Africa, the elasticities of substitution will be higher than the import demand elasticity, since competition among exports of manufactured commodities from the European Union, the United States, and Japan to East and Southern Africa is likely to be much stiffer than competition between European and African producers. Hertel et al. (2003) and Gallaway et al. (2003) . For Comoros, we have used ε = -0.7 and σ = -2.0 for total imports, since no disaggregated data could be obtained. 10 We have computed a single collection efficiency ratio for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, since all of them are members of the SACU customs union, sharing customs duties according to an agreement with South Africa and a specific formula. See Kirk and Stern (2005) for details.
13
Crucial to the subsequent empirical results, only the actual collected import duties will be incorporated in the analysis, since these duties, and not official tariff rates, are subject to the preferential tariff elimination. Collection ratio divided by import-weighted tariff rate. *Least-developed country.
11

Empirical Results
Under the likely terms of any EPA in East and Southern Africa, tariffs on EU imports are to be phased out gradually in the period from 2008 to 2020. Important for the following results, we focused on the final stage of tariff elimination rather than trying to estimate the impact of 11 Studies that have investigated the impact of trade liberalisation in Africa in the past, using import-weighted tariff rates, are likely to have arrived at biased estimates if collection ratios and tariff rates differ significantly. For example, none of the studies surveyed in the introduction has corrected for the discrepancies between the two rates. each stated cut. In addition, we assumed that a 100 per cent coverage ratio, that is, tariffs on all products, will be eliminated. This figure is, of course, an upper-bound estimate of the trade effects, since it is highly likely that East and Southern African countries would exclude certain products from the EPAs. In general, ACP countries have argued that no more than 80 to 85 per cent of imports should be liberalised (Hinkle and Newfarmer 2005) . This approach is feasible if the EU liberalises up to 100 per cent of its imports from Africa and the combined average arrives at some 90 per cent. 12 Depending on the final outcome of the negotiations, the actual trade and budget effects will be smaller in comparison to the 100 per cent tariff elimination assumed in our analysis. Nevertheless, our results provide an idea about the potentially maximum magnitude of the effects.
As can be seen from Table 5, The percentage increases for trade creation range from 2.4 per cent for Lesotho to 13.5 per cent for Burundi, whereas the (import-weighted) average for all East and Southern African countries amounts to 6.8 per cent. Non-beneficiary exporters would experience a decline in their shipments to East and Southern Africa by an average of 1.1 per cent, with country estimates in the range from 0.1 per cent for Lesotho to 8.1 per cent for Comoros.
Apart from Comoros, trade creation exceeds trade diversion in absolute values in all countries. The larger trade creation figures seem to be at odds at first glance, since the assumed substitution elasticities are higher than the import demand elasticities. Using a disaggregated approach, however, ensures that competition among exporters to African countries, affected by tariff elimination, is taken into account at an appropriate level, which reduces potential trade diversion effects. Also, the trade diversion formula in Verdoorn's model incorporates the share of non-preferential imports and corrects the substitution with the import demand elasticity, both of which reduce the magnitude of the trade diversion effects.
The differences in the trade effects among the two EPA groupings in East and Southern Africa arise mainly because of diverging trade barriers vis-à-vis EU imports, differences in competition intensities at the product level, import structures and tariff collection efficiency ratios. The far above-average estimates for Comoros can be explained by its high (importweighted) tariffs with respect to EU imports (38.9 per cent). In contrast, the rather small trade effects in Lesotho and Madagascar are due to low tariff barriers for EU imports and -in the case of Madagascar -a relatively poor performance in collecting statutory tariff rates.
To check for the robustness of these results, we could, for instance, double both the assumed values for the elasticity of substitution and the import demand elasticity for all three product categories, namely, agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods. As a consequence, trade creation and diversion would double as well.
13 Hence, we have to keep in mind that the assumptions regarding both elasticities are crucial for the expected trade effects.
Even though the assumed values for both elasticities are well within the range of estimates for other developing countries, they are still assumptions and may contain a possible bias for the trade effects.
In a further analysis, we have looked at commodities at the two-digit level of the Harmonised System that show far above-average trade effects. For this purpose, we have sorted all products by percentage changes in EU imports (total trade effect) in all individual countries.
Subsequently, we have counted the total number of top ten listings for each product group across African countries (Table 6 ). To give an example, the product category 61, articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, is among the top ten most affected commodities in 16 out of 21 ESA and SADC countries. 14 Though affected product groups are spread over various commodities, there are a number of categories for apparel and clothing products as well as related products, such as footwear or headgear, that are affected in a considerable number of countries, indicating that this sector might be particularly affected by the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements. Furthermore, some of these groups of products, which as we said, will experience the highest increases in import volumes after the tariff liberalisation, are also locally produced in ESA and SADC countries, which may lead to a (partial) displacement of domestically produced goods. This applies in particular to apparel and clothing products. 
As trade creation is larger than trade diversion (apart from Comoros), East and Southern
African countries may benefit from participating in an EPA. Based on Viner's (1950) seminal contribution, trade creation is associated with a welfare gain, as it means a shift from a less to a more efficient supplier, whereas trade diversion can be associated with a welfare loss, since it implies a change in imports from a more efficient to a less efficient importer. In spite of this, we cannot reach any final conclusions about the welfare impact of the EPAs from the relative magnitudes of trade effects alone. Even in a partial equilibrium framework, the negative impact from subsequent terms-of-trade effects or losses in tariff revenue resulting from trade liberalisation might outweigh the increase in consumer surplus.
Hence, we have to consider carefully any changes in government revenue, as the tariff elimination will reduce customs revenue. As shown in Table 7 , the decline in import duties in absolute figures ranges from US $0.3 million in Lesotho to US $88.1 million in Angola. 15 As a share of total import duties, the percentage figures vary considerably from some 1 per cent in Swaziland to 55 per cent Angola. With respect to the decline in import duties as a share of total government revenue, as it is expected the impact is higher in those countries, with higher tariff rates and higher dependence on trade taxes for their public revenue. Thus, Comoros and Djibouti in particular would face a severe impact on their public financial positions and their ability to provide public goods. Percentage declines in both countries amount to 24.5 and 14 per cent, respectively. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 7 , the reasons for the far aboveaverage (relative) decline in both countries' import duties are the relatively high tariff barriers for EU imports (38.9 and 27.8 per cent) and the higher dependence on customs revenue to finance public expenditure (46.5 and 37.5 per cent). Similar to the trade effects, the (average) impact on government finances is larger in ESA in comparison to SADC countries. Apart from Comoros and Djibouti, there are also relatively large revenue effects in Mauritius and Seychelles, with a decline of around 9 per cent of total government revenue or 1.7 and 3.1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, respectively. In most other East and Southern African countries, total government revenue in is likely to decline by 1 to 5 per cent. In view of thein some cases -considerable budget deficits in African ACP countries (Table 7 ) and the severe difficulties in raising revenues to finance public spending, these are relatively large figures, which are likely to have a strong impact on government finances.
For that reason, unavoidable government revenue losses need to be mitigated. In principle, this could be done by a more or less comprehensive tax or fiscal reform. It is widely recognised that trade taxes should be replaced with domestic indirect taxes. In theory, it is straightforward to replace import tariffs with domestic taxes. An import tariff, for example, is equivalent to an ad valorem (domestic) consumption tax and an ad valorem (domestic) production subsidy. Yet in reality most ESA countries already started in the 1990s implementing tax reforms, including the introduction of a value added tax system. However, experience has shown that they are often encountering severe difficulties in replacing import tariffs with other taxes or in collecting taxes domestically at all. Due to tax evasion, complicated tax systems and often low enforcement efforts, collecting taxes is relatively inefficient in many developing countries. According to calculations by Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) , the recovery rate for lost trade tax revenue for middle-income countries has been in the order of 45 to 60 cents for each dollar. Yet revenue recovery has been extremely weak in low-income countries, since they have recovered less than about 30 cents of each lost dollar.
Unfortunately, 15 out of 23 East and Southern African nations are least-developed countries.
What is more worrying, they are the countries that are most dependent on trade tax revenues.
All of the above points out at the need to strengthen tax enforcement mechanisms, but also at the difficulty of doing so.
Another issue arises from the assumption of competitive markets, which has been made in our calculations. For the projected trade and budget effects, we made the crucial assumption that European firms will reduce their export prices in line with the tariff elimination. In case of low competition intensities at the product level, however, the dismantling of trade barriers would place large European firms into a position with some market power. If European firms take advantage of that situation, maintain their prices at current levels ("pricing to market") 20 and increase their profits instead, ESA and SADC countries will simply lose customs revenue and thus, economic welfare will certainly decline.
Policy Options and Prerequisites for the EPAs
Given the likely significant trade and budget effects in a number of ESA and SADC countries, Economic Partnership Agreements would expose these countries to considerable structural adjustment costs, which arise from a reallocation of resources and the need to restructure indirect tax systems. Therefore, East and Southern African countries have ample reasons to reconsider their trade policy strategies and thoroughly assess alternative policy options at hand. Principally, they can opt for the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements or instead make use of the unilateral, non-reciprocal trade preferences, which the European Commission is already granting. In addition, they can continue to manage gradual liberalisation of their regional trade in the framework of existing regional integration schemes. Finally, they can liberalise unilaterally or in the course of current or future multilateral trade negotiations. Although the EBA offer appears as a sustainable political commitment, the European Union could still make use of the general safeguard clause, graduate most competitive products from certain beneficiaries or exclude a country totally, when it is removed from the official list of least-developed countries provided by the United Nations. Thus, least-developed countries do not hold a legal right to utilise EBA-preferences once and for all. Under an Economic Partnership Agreement, in contrast, least-developed countries would be contractual partners entitled to export on the terms which are agreed upon in a binding internal treaty, although standard safeguards would also be part of the agreements.
Moreover, an EPA appears to be an attractive option if integration into the world economy is part of the development strategy anyway. An EPA with the European Union could be a new impetus for liberalising domestic and external affairs. Related reforms could find more domestic support and would thus be more sustainable ("lock-in effect"). Also, an EPA could explicitly include commitments by the European Commission for technical and financial support to master related problems and cover sizeable adjustment costs. Likewise, multilateral agencies could provide additional financial and technical support.
Since 12 out of 16 of the ESA countries and three out of seven of SADC countries are leastdeveloped countries, the two EPA projects in the region depend on their participation. In order to involve them in an EPA, the European Commission not only needs to offer an EBAlike product coverage and equivalent preferential margins, but has to even go a step further.
For instance, the European Commission could provide less restrictive and simplified rules of origin, concessions for trade in services and immigration rules, reduction of non-tariff barriers, financial support to cover part of the adjustment costs and technical assistance to manage the process of structural change (Hinkle and Schiff 2004) .
ACP countries that do not belong to the group of least-developed countries would ceteris paribus be better off opting for an EPA as far as market access is concerned, since it is likely that the latter will offer better conditions than the more restrictive GSP option, to which they would have to revert, should they decide not to negotiate. Secured access to Europe's markets is a strong argument in favour of an EPA also for these countries, providing producers with a much more stable, long-term framework for export-oriented investment decisions. This advantage must, however, be balanced with the challenges and costs of structural adjustment.
Thus, Economic Partnership Agreements will not come without risks for ACP countries.
A fundamental prerequisite for the EPA option is the clearance of overlapping regional integration schemes in East and Southern Africa. Not only do both African groupings consist of least-developed and non-least-developed countries, but commitment to trade reform, both in terms of external and intra-regional liberalisation, differs substantially among SADC and ESA members as well. Accommodating these diverse interests may require a lot of flexibility in program design, taking into account the various stages of regional integration processes that are currently underway parallel to EPA negotiations. In fact, as several authors have suggested, the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements can provide an important impetus to the rationalisation and advancement of those processes (de la Rocha 2003 ). Yet if they are to complement and reinforce integration in the region, then important and difficult decisions to correct some of the current deficiencies will have to be taken. The situation for SACU countries is particularly complex: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are all ACP members and, therefore, part of the SADC group negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement. However, South Africa, which is the biggest SACU member and which has a central role in determining SACU's trade policies, is neither an ACP country nor is it included in EPA negotiations. Instead, South Africa has already signed a separate free trade agreement with the European Union, many aspects of which apply de facto to the other SACU countries.
17 Thus, even though South Africa is not covered by the trade provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, its free trade agreement with the European Union will affect the EPAs between the European Union and the other members of SACU. To address this problem, the European Union needs to consider including South Africa in the EPA negotiations in some way, in order to ensure some form of harmonisation of the EPA agreement and the free trade agreement between the European Union and South Africa.
As for SADC, its member countries are divided in two groups for the EPA negotiations. 6 of its 13 members are negotiating with the ESA group led by COMESA. The rest are grouped under the so-called SADC group, which is de facto a SACU + 3. The current situation will likely imply the end of SADC as a meaningful trading arrangement, and the consolidation of SACU as the real trade hub in Southern Africa. The former contradicts one of the stated objectives of the EPA negotiations of strengthening and deepening regional integration.
Above all, the EBA initiative has complicated the EPA process by creating different trading environments and negotiating incentives for the least-developed and non-least-developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation is anomalous and again it does not really help strengthen the regional integration process, which is supposed to be one of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. For this reason, the European Commission should consider offering EBA-like preferences to all ACP countries in the EPA negotiations.
There are many issues that have to be addressed and successfully dealt with in the current EPA negotiations, in order to ensure that they really achieve the development objectives envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. Like their counterparts in other ACP sub-regions, the East and Southern African countries should carefully ponder the advantages and disadvantages of signing Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union. This paper has attempted to assess some of the risks for East and Southern African countries, in terms of impact on trade flows and government revenue from a full tariff liberalisation of EU imports. The results suggest that the impact will not be negligible for most countries, and potentially very important for a number of them. In addition, the need to consolidate regional trading arrangements in East and Southern Africa arises whether EPAs would be concluded or not.
17 To complicate things further, SACU is currently in the process of negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States, its second largest trading partner.
